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SNIPING DOWN IGNORANCE CLAIMS: THE THIRD CIRCUIT IN




"You can put a cat in the oven, but that don't make it a biscuit."'
I. INTRODUCTION
This pearl of wisdom regarding cats in ovens, spoken in White Men
Can't jump by Wesley Snipes, whom the government recently targeted for
tax evasion, offers an apt analogy for the concept of knowledge in criminal
tax cases.2 Importantly, an individual's knowledge base includes those
facts that the individual knows both with and without absolute certainty.3
Knowledge in this context can never be an absolute because it includes
that which an individual would reasonably be expected to infer based on
facts known to the individual. 4
To illustrate this concept, Snipes's observation about cats and biscuit-
making can be insightful.' One need not perform any sort of research or
have any prior experience to know that by putting a cat into an oven, one
will not make a biscuit-only a burnt cat. Accordingly, claiming ignorance
after performing such an act would be met with sheer disbelief.6 One
* Special thanks to Professor T. Keith Fogg for his continued guidance and
insight on this Casebrief. I also thank my friends and family for both their
encouragement and helpful comments.
1. WHITE MEN CAN'T JUMP (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1992).
2. See United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 860 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming
Wesley Snipes's conviction for willful failure to file individual federal income tax
returns); see also Wesley Snipes, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wesley
Snipes (last modified Dec. 20, 2011) (detailing Wesley Snipes's film roles).
3. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 701-04 (9th Cir. 1976) (describing
justification for willful blindness instructions, which effectively became known as
"Jewell instructions").
4. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2 (2d ed. 2003)
("[O]ne has knowledge of a given fact when he has the means for obtaining such
knowledge, when he has notice of facts which would put one on inquiry as to the
existence of that fact, when he has information sufficient to generate a reasonable
belief as to that fact, or when the circumstances are such that a reasonable man
would believe that such a fact existed.").
5. For a discussion of how the quote-'You can put a cat in the oven, but that
don't make it a biscuit"-helps to illustrate the concept of knowledge in criminal
tax proceedings, see infra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
6. See generally Teignmouth Youths Sentenced for Microwave Cat Cruelty, BBC NEWS,
Feb. 9, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-12406528 (noting
harsh consequences for teens who put cat into microwave oven); see also GREMLINS
(779)
1
Zuraw: Sniping down Ignorance Claims: The Third Circuit in United States
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
cannot claim ignorance in a situation where common knowledge exists
about the consequences of an action.7 Given the inherent dangers in op-
erating high temperature appliances and the delicate nature of small
mammals, one would expect an individual combining these two in any way
to proceed with extreme caution.8 Claims of ignorance cannot serve as a
safe harbor for any kind of culpable conduct.9
As a comparison, individuals facing potential liability for tax crimes
often claim ignorance or misunderstanding of their relevant legal du-
ties. 10 In response, courts have increasingly limited a defendant's ability
to establish ignorance of their obligations under the tax code." In the
most publicized recent case, Wesley Snipes was himself unsuccessful in es-
tablishing such a defense.1 2
Defendants in criminal tax proceedings make assertions of ignorance
or misunderstanding primarily because federal tax statutes involve unique
considerations that distinguish them from the majority of federal crimes.' 3
(Warner Bros. Pictures 1984) (depicting outcome of microwaving small monstrous
creature).
7. See United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 2010) ("No one
can avoid responsibility for a crime by deliberately ignoring what is obvious.")
8. See, e.g., Cat Grooming, ANIMALHosprrALs-USA, http://www.animalhospitals-
usa.com/cats/cat-grooming.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) (instructing individu-
als, after bathing cat, to dry cat with hair dryer on medium heat setting only and to
hold dryer one foot away from cat).
9. See United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that
"deliberate ignorance cannot become a safe harbor for culpable conduct").
10. See, e.g., United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2010) (detail-
ing Snipes's claim of good faith reliance on advice of counsel); Tenured Law Prof
(Former Tax Lawyer) Convicted of Failing to File Tax Returns, TAXPROF BLOG (Feb. 11,
2011, 9:20 AM), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof blog/2011/02/tenured-law-
prof.html (reporting how tax professor convicted for failing to file state tax returns
claimed misunderstanding of tax law).
11. For a discussion of how courts have used willful blindness instructions
against defendants' claims of ignorance, see infra notes 54-74 and accompanying
text.
12. See Snipes, 611 F.3d at 862 (affirming defendant Wesley Snipes's conviction
despite good faith instruction to jury, which stated that "one who expresses an
honestly held opinion or an honestly formed belief is not chargeable with fraudu-
lent intent, even though the opinion is erroneous or the belief is mistaken"). Ac-
tor Wesley Snipes is currently serving a three-year sentence for willful failure to file
individual federal income tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203, for three
consecutive years. See id. at 859 (summarizing Snipes's convictions); see also
Michael Martinez, Actor Wesley Snipes Reports to Prison to Begin Sentence, CNN ENTM'T,
Dec. 9, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-09/entertainment/snipesjail-l1
tax-returns-charges-of-tax-fraud-tax-protesters?_s=PM:SHOWBIZ (reporting details
of Snipes's conviction).
13. See Kathryn Keneally & Charles P. Rettig, Supreme Court Emphasizes Limits
on Criminal Tax Enforcement: The Boulware Decision, J. TAx PRAc. & PROC., Apr.-May
2008, at 19 (noting complex nature of federal tax statutes). Federal tax statutes
are "'a system of sanctions which . .. were calculated to induce prompt and forth-
right fulfillment of every duty under the income tax law and to provide a penalty
suitable to every degree of delinquency.'" Id. (quoting Spies v. United States, 317
U.S. 492, 497 (1943)).
780 [Vol. 56: p. 779
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Congress long ago recognized the complexities of complying with the tax
code and established "willfulness" as the requisite mens rea for tax
crimes.' 4 Subsequent interpretation of willfulness by the courts has set a
high standard for conviction: voluntary and intentional violation of a
known legal duty.' 5
In cases where the record contains sufficient factual support, non-tax
fraud case law has concretely recognized the government's entitlement to
a willful blindness instruction, also called "conscious avoidance" or "delib-
erate ignorance." 16 In criminal tax cases, however, much controversy has
surrounded the use of willful blindness instructions.1 7 The U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Cheek v. United States'8 provided a strict interpretation
of the willfulness element of tax statutes, casting doubt on the appropriate-
ness of willful blindness to establish willfulness.19 Cheek's emphasis on a
14. See 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006) (criminalizing attempts to evade or defeat
taxes that are "willfully" made).
15. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (adhering to prece-
dent which previously established definition of willfulness in criminal tax proceed-
ings). Tax crimes at all levels, whether felonies or misdemeanors, require proof of
"willful" conduct. See Spies, 317 U.S. at 497 ("The difference between willful failure
to pay a tax when due, which is made a misdemeanor, and willful attempt to defeat
and evade one, which is made a felony, is not easy to detect or define. Both must
be willful, and willful, as we have said, is a word of many meanings, its construction
often being influenced by its context."); see also Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201 (relying on
precedent established by United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 361 (1973), and
United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976)).
16. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Tax Evasion as White Collar Fraud, 9 Hous. Bus.
& TAx L.J. 207, 211 (2009) (noting that in non-tax cases, courts have defined "will-
fulness" much less strictly than in tax fraud cases). Defendants can avoid convic-
tion with evidence of a good faith belief that they were complying with tax laws. See
id. (describing defense to government's establishment of willfulness in tax cases);
see also Alan Leibman, Willful Blindness Charge Available in Tax Cases to Prove Knowl-
edge of a Legal Duty, Fox ROTHSCHILD: WHITE COLLAR DEFENSE & COMPLIANCE BLOC
(Oct. 5, 2010), http://whitecollarcrime.foxrothschild.com/2010/10/articles/tax-
prosecutions/willful-blindness-charge-available-in-tax-cases-to-prove-knowledge-of-
a-legal-duty/ (stating that such instructions are appropriate when government
lacks direct evidence that defendant acted willfully but can point to circumstantial
evidence that defendant turned blind eye to facts which should have made defen-
dant aware of relevant legal duties).
17. See Patricia H. Bucy, Criminal Tax Fraud: The Downfall of Murderers, Madams
and Thieves, 29 Amuz. ST. L.J. 639, 664 (1997) (remarking on controversy surround-
ing use of willful blindness instructions in criminal tax cases).
18. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
19. See Mark D. Yochum, Cheek is Chic. Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse for Tax
Crimes-A Fashion That Does Not Wear Well, 31 Duo. L. REv. 249, 271 (1993) (sug-
gesting uncertainty for willful blindness instructions will follow Cheek). Professor
Yochum postulated that, although the Supreme Court's holding in Cheek should
not have affected the government's use of willful blindness instructions in criminal
tax cases, defendants would attempt to argue that actual knowledge must be di-
rectly proven. See id. (noting that willful blindness instructions have been useful to
infer knowledge of illegality). Settling the debate among the circuit courts, Cheek
rejected the idea that willfulness must be evaluated according to an objective stan-
dard. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200 (explaining that "the statutory term 'willfully' as
used in the federal criminal tax statutes . . . carv[es] out an exception to the tradi-
2012] CASEBRIEF 781
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defendant's subjective state of mind has confounded the lower courts re-
garding their use of willful blindness instructions. 20
This Casebrief evaluates the recent softening of Cheek's willfulness
standard by circuit court jurisprudence upholding willful blindness in-
structions, and it underscores the duty implicitly imposed on taxpayers to
acknowledge their obligations under the tax code. 21 Part 11 of this
Casebrief discusses the willfulness requirement for criminal tax cases as
established long ago and subsequently reiterated in Cheek.22 After an anal-
ysis of the circuit courts' treatment of willful blindness instructions, Part II
traces the Third Circuit's decisions in criminal tax cases-specifically the
court's definition of willfulness and its historical use of willful blindness
instructions.2 3 Part III discusses the Third Circuit's holding in United
States v. Stadtmauer,24 which upheld a willful blindness instruction in a
criminal tax fraud case.25 Part IV analyzes the Third Circuit's take on
Cheek's interpretation of willfulness and offers guidance to practitioners in
the Third Circuit handling criminal tax cases.26 Finally, Part V concludes
by emphasizing the necessity of willful blindness instructions to limit
claims of ignorance where taxpayers have deliberately avoided their obli-
gations under the tax code.2 7
tional rule. This special treatment of criminal tax offenses is largely due to the
complexity of the tax laws.").
20. See JOHN A. ToWNSEND ET AL., TAx CRIMES 36-38 (2008) (noting uncer-
tainty regarding willful blindness instructions in criminal tax cases requiring will-
fulness); Bucy, supra note 17, at 663 (describing split in circuits after Cheek
regarding use of deliberate disregard instruction). The debate surrounding willful
blindness instructions involves the notion established by Cheek that a defendant
who, in subjective good faith, is unaware of a legal duty cannot be guilty of tax
fraud. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202 (noting that government must prove that defen-
dant was aware of legal duty and negate defendant's good faith misunderstanding
or ignorance).
21. For a discussion of circuit court jurisprudence regarding willful blindness
instructions in criminal tax proceedings, see infra notes 54-106 and accompanying
text.
22. For a discussion of the evolution of the interpretation of the willfulness
standard, see infra notes 28-53 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of three distinct categories of circuit courts regarding
their interpretation of willfulness in regard to the Supreme Court's decision in
Cheek, see infra notes 54-74 and accompanying text.
24. 620 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2010).
25. For an analysis of the district court's willful blindness instructions and the
constructive evaluation by the Third Circuit, see infra notes 75-106 and accompany-
ing text.
26. For an analysis of how the Third Circuit's decision in Stadtmauer will affect
attorneys practicing in the criminal tax field, see infra notes 107-40 and accompa-
nying text.
27. For a discussion of the importance of willful blindness instructions, see
infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
782 [Vol. 56: p. 779
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE WILLFULNESS STANDARD IN TAX CRIMES
A. The Willfulness Standard: A Taxing History
The willfulness standard in criminal tax cases has an unsettled history,
having endured significant revision since its original interpretation by the
Supreme Court.2 8 The Court's consistency in defining willfulness has
been anything but "an artful tapestry woven with foresight."2 9 As initially
interpreted by the Court, willfulness required "an act done with a bad pur-
pose" or "with an evil motive."3 0 For the next several decades, much con-
fusion surfaced as to how evil intent fit within the willfulness standard.3 '
In 1976, the Court finally settled on the existing definition, holding in
United States v. Pomponios2 that willfulness requires "a voluntary, intentional
violation of a known legal duty."3 3
Though the Pomponio definition of willfulness persists as the stated
standard, it has not been consistently interpreted by the lower courts.34 In
Cheek, the Supreme Court provided further clarification for the willfulness
standard in the criminal tax context, requiring the government to prove,
on a subjective basis, that a defendant both knew of the legal duty imposed
and voluntarily and intentionally violated such duty.3 5 The Cheek defini-
tion aided courts in resolving existing conflicts, but made tax crime con-
victions more difficult for the government by restricting the determination
of willfulness to a subjective evaluation.3 6 Following Cheek, interpretations
28. See generally Yochum, supra note 19, at 252 (tracing history of Supreme
Court's interpretation of "willfulness").
29. Id.
30. See United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1933) (providing
Court's initial definition of "willfulness"), overruled on other grounds by Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). In Murdock, the Supreme
Court reasoned that "Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona
fide misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return,
or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by
his mere failure to measure up to the prescribed standard of conduct." Id. at 396;
see also Yochum, supra note 19, at 252 (citing complexity of tax code laws as
grounds for Congress's intent that "willfully" include more than purposeful
conduct).
31. See United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 361 (1973) (requiring element
of evil motive to establish willfulness); Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 498
(1943) (holding that willfulness includes "some element of evil motive").
32. 429 U.S. 10 (1976).
33. See id. at 11 (stating that lower court "incorrectly assumed that the refer-
ence to an 'evil motive' in United States v. Bishop . .. and prior cases meant some-
thing more than the specific intent to violate the law").
34. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 198 (1991) (explaining conflict-
ing interpretations of "willfully" among circuit courts).
35. See id. at 201 ("[T]he standard for the statutory willfulness requirement is
the 'voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.'").
36. SeeYochum, supra note 19, at 253 (noting that "even irrational beliefs held
in good faith with respect to the obligations of the Internal Revenue Code vitiated
the willfulness requirement of tax crimes"). To establish willfulness, therefore, the
government must prove the defendant's actual knowledge of illegality. See id. (sug-
7832012] CASEBRIEF
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by the circuit courts have softened this standard.3 7 Most notably, the cir-
cuit courts have continually employed the willful blindness doctrine to in-
struct the jury on the knowledge aspect of willfulness.38 Such willful
blindness instructions have enabled the government to obtain convictions
in criminal tax cases where defendants may otherwise have established
their claim of ignorance and thus averted criminal liability for their
actions."
B. United States v. Cheek: Deducting Objective Considerations
from Willfulness Determinations
The requirement of willfulness in criminal tax statutes separates tax-
payers who, in good faith, violate their legal obligations under the tax
code from taxpayers who deliberately seek to take advantage of the sys-
tem.40 Because the tax code is increasing in complexity, both taxpayer
compliance and enforcement efforts by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) are severely impacted.4 1 The significant burden of understanding
gesting that evaluating reasonableness of defendant's belief allows government to
avoid burden of proof of all elements of crime).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Anthony, 545 F.3d 60, 64-65 (1st Cir. 2008) (hold-
ing willful blindness instruction appropriate in tax evasion case); United States v.
Dean, 487 F.3d 840, 851 (11th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Dykstra, 991 F.2d
450 (8th Cir. 1993) (same). For further discussion of how several circuit courts
have lessened the government's burden of proof to establish willfulness, see infra
notes 54-74 and accompanying text.
38. See Anthony, 545 F.3d at 64-65 (holding willful blindness instruction appro-
priate in tax evasion case); Dean, 487 F.3d at 851 (same); Dykstra, 991 F.2d at 452
(same).
39. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (reasoning that if
courts treated willful blindness differently than positive knowledge, criminals
could avoid liability simply by turning blind eye to facts that they should have
known (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1985))). Avoiding criminal liability,
however, does not implicate a defendant's potential civil liability under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 6663(a) (2006) ("If any part of any underpayment
of tax required to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there shall be added to the
tax an amount equal to 75 percent of the portion of the underpayment which is
attributable to fraud.").
40. CAMILLA E. WATSON, TAX PROCEDURE AND TAX FRAUD IN A NUTSHELL 346
(3d ed. 2006) (providing Congress's reasoning for requiring willfulness in criminal
tax proceedings). Willfulness serves as a buffer between innocent taxpayers and
punishment for tax crime convictions. See id. at 346-47 (noting that willfulness
"shields from conviction those who make innocent or even negligent errors, or
who genuinely misunderstand the law").
41. Press Release, Taxpayer Advocate Serv., National Taxpayer Advocate De-
livers Annual Report to Congress; Focuses on Tax Reform, Collection Issues, and
Implementation of Health Care Reform (Jan. 5, 2011), available at http://www.tax
payeradvocate.irs.gov/Media-Resources/Press-Release (noting burdens imposed
on taxpayers by complexity of tax code and challenges IRS faces in enforcement);
see also United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360-61 (1973) ("In our complex tax
system, uncertainty often arises even among taxpayers who earnestly wish to follow
the law. . . . 'It is not the purpose of the law to penalize frank difference of opin-
ion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of reasonable care.'" (quoting
Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 496 (1943))). But see Yochum, supra note 19,
784
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one's tax obligations and filing properly completed returns naturally re-
sults in tax noncompliance. 42 The Supreme Court long ago recognized
the need to protect innocent taxpayers from punishment when such mis-
takes are made in good faith, and therefore rigorously upheld the require-
ment that the government prove willfulness in criminal tax cases.4 3
The Supreme Court has continually reiterated that tax convictions re-
quire the government to prove a defendant's voluntary and intentional
violation of a known legal duty.4 4 In Cheek, the Court was presented with
the question of how courts should more precisely interpret willfulness-
specifically, whether willfulness in the criminal tax context should be de-
termined under an objective or a subjective standard.4 5 The petitioner in
at 252 (opining that tax code is no longer "an arcane regulatory device but rather
that it is well-understood in its fundamental obligations").
42. See Spies, 317 U.S. at 496 (explaining that "the [tax] law is complicated,
accounting treatment of various items raises problems of great complexity, and
innocent errors are numerous"). The Supreme Court in Spies posited that the
purpose of criminal tax statutes is not to penalize honest mistakes. See id. (provid-
ing that complexity of tax code may lead to errors despite individual's exercise of
reasonable care).
43. See generally United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933) (holding that
defendant who failed to supply information on income tax return due to bona fide
misunderstanding could not be guilty of willfully failing to supply such informa-
tion), overruled on other grounds by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor,
378 U.S. 52 (1964). Statutory willfulness, a much higher standard than mere
knowledge, requires the "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."
See United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11 (1976) (providing existing defini-
tion for willfulness). The Supreme Court in Pomponio followed the definition of
willfulness that several circuit court decisions had employed when interpreting this
issue. See id. at 12-13 (noting adherence to standard set by circuit courts).
44. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) ("Taken together,
Bishop and Pomponio conclusively establish that the standard for the statutory will-
fulness requirement is the 'voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal
duty."'). The Supreme Court further held that "[a] good-faith misunderstanding
of the law or a good-faith belief that one is not violating the law negates willfulness,
whether or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable."
Id. at 192. One consequence of this definition of willfulness is that "an irrational
belief sincerely held put before a sympathetic jury results in acquittal." See
Yochum, supra note 19, at 252 (suggesting that willfulness should "refer to the act
itself, purposefully not paying tax").
45. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199 (noting that grant of certiorari was due to disa-
greement between circuit courts as to interpretation of willfulness). Following a
period of discord in the circuit courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
hear a Seventh Circuit case. See id. at 198-99 (detailing Seventh Circuit's interpre-
tation of willfulness element). In the Seventh Circuit, actual ignorance of the ap-
plicable law was not a defense unless such ignorance was objectively reasonable.
See id. (noting that Seventh Circuit court had determined that neither taxpayer's
belief that tax laws are unconstitutional nor that wages are not income would qual-
ify as objectively reasonable). The Seventh Circuit had been implementing this
definition of willfulness for over ten years, despite the fact that the other circuits
had been interpreting willfulness according to a subjective standard. See Yochum,
supra note 19, at 249-50 (specifying that Seventh Circuit was instructingjuries that
"only those beliefs of the defendant which were objectively reasonable might be
considered as a defense to the willfulness requirement").
7852012] CASEBRIEF
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Cheek, the infamous airline pilot, testified that he honestly and reasonably
believed that the tax code was being unconstitutionally enforced, and that
he therefore lacked the willful conduct required to be convicted.4 6 In its
opinion, the Court reasoned that the statutory requirement of willfulness
in tax crimes creates an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of
the law is not a defense to liability.47 The Court ultimately rejected the
notion that a claim of good faith belief must be objectively reasonable,
ruling instead that willfulness should be determined under a subjective
standard.4 8 Cheek's defense was consequently evaluated according to his
own personal, subjective belief, as opposed to whether his belief was
reasonable.49
46. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 195-96 (summarizing petitioner's testimony in which
he admitted not filing tax returns but believed federal tax code was
unconstitutional).
47. See id. at 200, 207 (stating holding of case). The Court ultimately re-
manded the case for further proceedings. See id. at 206 (noting "defendant's views
about the validity of the tax statutes are irrelevant to the issue of willfulness").
48. See id. at 203 (disagreeing with Seventh Circuit's interpretation of willful-
ness). The Court noted that categorizing a taxpayer's particular belief as objec-
tively reasonable or unreasonable would change the inquiry from factual to legal;
therefore, it would no longer be a jury determination. See id. (concluding that
such change in inquiry would implicate "serious" Sixth Amendment jury trial is-
sues). In so holding, the Court determined that the willfulness standard, which
requires "a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty," invalidated the
government's instructions to the jury to "disregard evidence of Cheek's under-
standing that . . . he was not a person required to file a return or to pay income
taxes." See id. at 201, 203-04 (emphasis added) (noting that "the more unreasona-
ble the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will con-
sider them to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal duties
imposed by the tax laws and will find that the Government has carried its burden
of proving knowledge").
49. See id. at 202 (stating that "if Cheek asserted that he truly believed that the
Internal Revenue Code did not purport to treat wages as income, and the jury
believed him, the Government would not have carried its burden to prove willful-
ness"). The Court noted that, in order to establish a defendant's subjective belief,
juries may consider any admissible evidence to establish the defendant's awareness
of his or her legal duties under the tax code. See id. (listing evidence that jury may
consider to establish Cheek's awareness, including evidence showing he was aware
of relevant provisions of tax code). The petitioner in Cheek had been charged with
(1) willfully failing to file federal income tax returns and (2) willfully attempting to
evade income taxes for his failure to file federal income tax returns for several
years. See id. at 194-95 (providing facts of case). The petitioner was indicted for
ten violations of federal tax law, including six counts of willfully failing to file fed-
eral income tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203 and three counts of will-
fully attempting to evade income taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. See id. at
194 (outlining charges against Cheek).
Section 7203 provides that:
[alny person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax ...
who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax . . . at the time or times
required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties pro-
vided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof,
shall be fined not more than $25,000 ($100,000 in the case of a corpora-
tion), or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with the
costs of prosecution.
786 [Vol. 56: p. 779
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To prove that a defendant has actual knowledge of his legal obliga-
tions under the tax code, the government must often negate either a de-
fendant's claim of ignorance of the law or a misunderstanding of the legal
duties imposed-both of which may establish a defendant's good faith be-
lief that he did not violate any tax code provision.5 0 The difficulty in ne-
gating such claims stems from the fact that an individual cannot
simultaneously be aware that the law imposes a duty and also be ignorant
of that duty.51 A distinction, therefore, arises between two types of individ-
uals: those with actual knowledge of a legal duty and those who, in good
faith, are ignorant of that duty, misunderstand it, or believe that it does
not exist.5 2 Criminal tax liability cannot attach to a person in the latter
category, and even a subjective mistake by a defendant, regardless of how
objectively unreasonable, negates willfulness in a criminal tax case.5 3
C. Accounting for Circuit Court Treatment of Willful Blindness
Despite the Supreme Court's attempt at clarification in Cheek, uncer-
tainty has prevailed on the proper interpretation of the willfulness stan-
26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2006). Section 7201 provides that:
[a]ny person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any
tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a
corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together
with the costs of prosecution.
26 U.S.C. § 7201.
Cheek believed that the tax code was being unconstitutionally enforced with
regard to tax on wages, and therefore believed that his actions were lawful. See
Cheek, 498 U.S. at 196 (providing background of Cheek's belief that federal tax
system was unconstitutional). Cheek's belief arose from seminars he attended,
where lawyers spoke and purportedly gave professional opinions regarding the
constitutionality of the federal tax system. See id. (stating how Cheek began to
follow advice of group that sponsored seminars). Cheek even produced as evi-
dence a letter in which an attorney explained that that the Sixteenth Amendment
did not allow the government to tax wages or salaries. See id. (noting level of "in-
doctrination" that Cheek received from participating in seminars and following
advice of group).
50. See id. at 202 (concluding that "if Cheek asserted that he truly believed
that the Internal Revenue Code did not purport to treat wages as income, and the
jury believed him, the Government would not have carried its burden to prove
willfulness, however unreasonable a court might deem such a belief").
51. See id. at 202-03 (stating that ultimate issue in such cases is whether gov-
ernment proved that defendant was aware of duty).
52. See id. at 202 (distinguishing between innocent taxpayers and those who
seek to take advantage of complex tax code). In such cases, the issue turns on
"whether, based on all the evidence, the Government has proved that the defen-
dant was aware of the duty at issue, which cannot be true if the jury credits a good-
faith misunderstanding and belief submission, whether or not the claimed belief
or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable" Id.
53. See id. at 202 (concluding that individuals with good faith ignorance of
legal duty or those who misunderstand their duties should not face criminal liabil-
ity); see also United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 255 (2010) (reiterating
Supreme Court's holding regarding standard for willfulness in Cheek).
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dard for tax crimes.5 4 In particular, because Cheek did not specifically
address the issue of willful blindness, disagreement has arisen as to
whether such instructions are appropriate in these cases.5 5 Without direct
guidance from the Supreme Court, the circuit courts have split into three
distinct groups regarding the use of willful blindness instructions.5 6
The first group consists of courts that have specifically held that the
government's use of willful blindness instructions to establish willfulness
does not run afoul of Cheek.5 7 These courts have interpreted Cheek as pro-
viding that, though an individual's belief that one is complying with the
tax laws need not be "objectively reasonable" to constitute a defense, such
belief nonetheless must be "held in good faith."58 A defendant's claim
alleging a lack of knowledge of that defendant's tax obligations fails if the
defendant's ignorance was a result of deliberate avoidance of materials
that would have informed the defendant of the applicable legal duty, as
such an avoidance undermines the claim of good faith.5 9 Therefore, it
follows that willful blindness instructions do not violate the standard for
willfulness set forth in Cheek.60
54. See Bucy, supra note 17, at 664 (noting split in circuits regarding use of
willful blindness instructions after Cheek).
55. See Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 256 (remarking how Cheek did not discuss will-
ful blindness instructions).
56. For a discussion of how circuit courts are divided in their treatment of
willful blindness instructions, see infra notes 57-74 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Anthony, 545 F.3d 60, 64-65 (1st Cir. 2008) (hold-
ing willful blindness instructions appropriate in criminal tax proceedings and do
not violate willfulness standard set in Cheek); United States v. Dean, 487 F.3d 840,
851 (11th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Dykstra, 991 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1993)
(same).
58. See Anthony, 545 F.3d at 65 (providing requirements for defense based on
knowledge requirements in tax cases); Dean, 487 F.3d at 851 (same).
59. See Anthony, 545 F.3d at 65 (placing significance on element of good faith
belief that defendant was not aware of legal duty to pay taxes); Dean, 487 F.3d at
851 (finding district court's willful blindness instruction concerning good faith ac-
curately stated law within context of Cheek).
60. See Anthony, 545 F.3d at 65 (labeling defendant "mistaken" for relying on
Cheek as grounds for invalidation of willful blindness instruction); Dean, 487 F.3d at
851 (concluding willful blindness instructions did not run afoul of Cheek and accu-
rately stated law regarding willfulness). Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has continu-
ally held that willful blindness instructions are appropriate in criminal tax cases.
See, e.g, United States v. Marston, 517 F.3d 996 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding district
court was required to give willful blindness instruction concerning case of tax eva-
sion); United States v. Willis, 277 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that evidence
was sufficient to establish willful blindness instruction and that such instruction
was appropriate in tax evasion case). Most notably, the Eighth Circuit drew on
language from Cheek to reject a defendant's claim that willful blindness instruc-
tions violated Cheek and labeled the defendant's reliance on Cheek to refute the jury
instructions "seriously misplaced" in upholding his conviction. See United States v.
Bussey, 942 F.2d 1241, 1249 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Cheek's language "'that a
good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief that one is not violat-
ing the law, if it is to negate willfulness, must be objectively reasonable"' (citation
omitted)). The Eighth Circuit thus found that the district court properly submit-
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In contrast, the Ninth Circuit stands alone in issuing a decision that
determined that a willful blindness instruction was improperly given to the
jury.6 1 The court drew a sharp line between actual knowledge and delib-
erate avoidance of knowledge.6 2 According to the Ninth Circuit, a willful
blindness instruction is appropriate only where a defendant deliberately
avoids "confirming the existence of a fact she all but knew."63
Finally, the remaining circuits have upheld willful blindness instruc-
tions in criminal tax cases, without specifically relying on Cheek.64 Several
circuit courts upheld willful blindness instructions prior to Cheek, but have
not heard similar subsequent cases that take this decision into account.65
Decisions by these courts held that the instructions issued to the jury prop-
erly required the level of intent necessary to establish willfulness. 66 The
ted a willful blindness instruction to the jury. See id. at 1249-50 (rejecting defen-
dant's arguments that willful blindness instructions were improper).
61. See United States v. Mapelli, 971 F.2d 284, 285 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that "deliberate ignorance instruction incorrectly diluted the government's duty to
prove knowledge").
62. See id. at 287 (noting that evidence pointed to actual knowledge as op-
posed to willful blindness). The court stressed that willful blindness instructions
should be used "sparingly" and should not serve as a routine instruction. See id at
286 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining instances in which willful
blindness instructions are inappropriate).
63. See id. (stating that instruction is not appropriate when evidence could
justify that defendant had actual knowledge (citing United States v. Sanchez-Ro-
bles, 927 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007))).
64. See United States v. Hauert, 40 F.3d 197, 203 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding
district court's use of deliberate avoidance instruction that "' [n]o person can in-
tentionally avoid knowledge by closing his or her eyes to information or facts
which would otherwise have been obvious"' (citation omitted)); United States v.
Wisenbaker, 14 F.3d 1022, 1027-28 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding deliberate ignorance
instruction appropriate because evidence supported "inference of deliberate indif-
ference" to relevant legal duty).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Fingado, 934 F.2d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir. 1991)
(holding that evidence supported willful blindness instruction); United States v.
Martin, 773 F.2d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 1985) (upholding district court's instructions
on willful blindness). The Fourth Circuit in Martin held that the jury instructions,
which stated that "[t]he element of knowledge ... may be satisfied by inferences
that have been drawn from proof that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to
what would otherwise have been obvious to him," were appropriate. Martin, 773
F.2d at 584 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. See, e.g., Fingado, 934 F.2d at 1166 (finding that jury was properly in-
structed); Martin, 773 F.2d at 584 (noting that "'willful[ness] ... requires more
than a mere showing of careless disregard of the truth.'" (quoting United States v.
Eilertson, 707 F.2d 108, 110 (4th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
In Martin, the Fourth Circuit found that a willful blindness instruction was consis-
tent with the standard of willfulness established by the Supreme Court in Pomponio.
See Martin, 773 F.2d at 584 (declining to follow Fifth Circuit precedent, which
found that similar instruction equated willful blindness with reckless disregard).
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Fingado upheld a willful blindness
instruction when the evidence supported a finding that the defendant intention-
ally avoided knowledge. See Fingado, 934 F.2d at 1166 (concluding evidence sup-
ported finding that defendant was "aware of a high probability that his
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rest of the circuits within this group, though not specifically relying on
Cheek, have approved of a willful blindness instruction that applies to a
defendant's knowledge of the law.6 7
D. The Third Circuit and Willful Blindness
Prior to Stadtmauer, the Third Circuit's position on willful blindness in
criminal tax cases remained uncertain.6 8 In United States v. Retos,69 the
court seemingly rejected the allowance of deliberate ignorance by holding
that the government was required to prove actual knowledge in a tax eva-
sion case. 70 The Third Circuit has long endorsed willful blindness, how-
ever, as an appropriate vehicle for establishing the requisite mens rea in
non-tax criminal cases, reinforcing the notion that non-tax fraud cases
may have different standards for willfulness than tax crimes.7 '
understanding of the tax laws was erroneous and consciously avoided obtaining
actual knowledge of his obligations").
67. See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 79 F. App'x 813, 825 (6th Cir. 2003)
(upholding deliberate ignorance instructions in trial for Ponzi scheme involving
tax evasion); Hauert, 40 F.3d at 203 (upholding district court's use of deliberate
avoidance, instruction that "[n]o person can intentionally avoid knowledge by clos-
ing his or her eyes to information or facts which would otherwise have been obvi-
ous" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wisenbaker, 14 F.3d at 1027-28 (holding
deliberate ignorance instruction appropriate because evidence supported "infer-
ence of deliberate indifference" to relevant legal duty). In United States v.
Wisenbaker, the Fifth Circuit similarly held that a willful blindness instruction was
appropriate in light of the defense that the defendant believed that he was not
responsible for the taxes, due to evidence that the defendant failed to file tax re-
turns even after his accountants informed him of his duty to do so. See Wisenbaker,
14 F.3d at 1027-28 (discussing testimony regarding defendant's belief that he was
not responsible for relevant taxes). Likewise, the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Hauert affirmed the defendant's conviction for tax evasion where the facts "'sup-
port[ed] the inference that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the
existence of the fact in question [tax liability] and purposefully contrived to avoid
learning all of the facts.'" Hauert, 40 F.3d at 203 n.7 (quoting United States v. de
Francisco-Lopez, 939 F.2d 1405, 1409 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
68. See generally United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2010) (es-
tablishing standard for willful blindness within Third Circuit).
69. 25 F.3d 1220 (3d Cir. 1994).
70. See id. at 1229-30 (stating that "actual knowledge" is required to prove
willfulness). The court therefore suggested that a willful blindness instruction is
not appropriate in tax cases that require willfulness. See Bucy, supra note 17, at
662-64 (noting split in circuits regarding willful blindness instructions in tax cases).
71. See, e.g., Pierre v. Att'y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating
knowledge can be established by willful blindness); United States v. Wasserson, 418
F.3d 225, 237 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding evidence of willful blindness satisfies requi-
site mens rea of knowledge in case involving unlawful disposal of hazardous waste);
United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that "willful
blindness instruction is often described as sounding in 'deliberate ignorance"' (cit-
ing United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 807-08 (3d Cir. 1994)));
United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that deliber-
ate ignorance is met when "the defendant himself was subjectively aware of the
high probability of the fact in question, and not merely [if] a reasonable man
would have been aware of the probability").
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The Third Circuit's recent interpretation of Cheek relied on its non-
tax precedent of allowing the government's use of willful blindness in-
structions to instruct the jury on willfulness.7 2 To adhere to established
precedent, a willful blindness instruction issued within the Third Circuit
must clarify that a defendant's awareness of the high probability of the fact
in question should be a subjective awareness, not merely a reasonable
one.73 Moreover, the Third Circuit has firmly advocated a harsh stance,
declaring that "deliberate ignorance cannot become a safe harbor for cul-
pable conduct."7 4
III. REFUSING TO IGNORE WILLFUL BLINDNESS: THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S
DECISION IN STADTMAUER
A. Factual Background
The moral of Richard Stadtmauer's story is twofold (as is Wesley
Snipes's): first, influential taxpayers in noncompliance with the tax code
make prime targets for the IRS, and second, relying on accountants does
not absolve liability.75 The Stadtmauer case stems from the investigation of
Charles Kushner, a prominent real estate entrepreneur who controlled
hundreds of limited partnerships.7 6 In 2004, Kushner pled guilty to assist-
ing in the filing of false partnership tax returns and federal campaign con-
72. See Stadtmauer 620 F.3d at 257 (concluding willful blindness instruction
adhered to Third Circuit precedent).
73. See Caminos, 770 F.2d at 365 (detailing requirements for willful blindness
instruction). Furthermore, if evidence sufficiently supports such a charge, "it is
not inconsistent for a court to give a charge on both willful blindness and actual
knowledge, for if the jury does not find the existence of actual knowledge, it might
still find willful blindness." WertRuiz, 228 F.3d at 255 (citing United States v. Stew-
art, 185 F.3d 112, 126 (3d Cir. 1999)).
74. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d at 250. In Wert-Ruiz, the court reasoned that if the
defendant deliberately avoided learning of the illegality of certain funds at issue in
a money laundering case, she could not have honestly claimed to lack knowledge.
See id. at 258 (noting that failure to uphold district court's jury instructions would
bring about "harmful results"). A willful blindness instruction in that case, there-
fore, "served the important purpose of preventing Wert-Ruiz from evading culpa-
bility if the jury concluded that due to a willful refusal to connect the dots, Wert-
Ruiz actually did not know of the purposes of her money laundering activities." Id.
(citing United States v. Sharma, 190 F.3d 220, 231 (3d Cir. 1999)).
75. See Ray A. Knight & Lee G. Knight, Criminal Tax Fraud: An Analytical Re-
view, 57 Mo. L. REv. 175, 178 (1992) (stating that IRS "may be more likely to press
a case involving a locally prominent taxpayer than a relatively obscure person"); see
also Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 259 (noting Stadtmauer's obligations to ask account-
ants about information contained in tax returns).
76. See Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 242 (providing background of case). Charles
Kushner is also a prominent political fundraiser and philanthropist in New Jersey,
and each of his partnerships managed a single commercial or residential property.
See id. (noting that Kushner is general partner for most partnerships, and his sib-
lings and their children are general partners of remaining partnerships). The
partnerships collectively operated under the name Kushner Companies, which is
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tribution offenses.7 7 While investigating Kushner, the Government also
indicted several other individuals who were involved in the alleged tax
fraud, including Stadtmauer.78
Stadtmauer, who was also Kushner's brother-in-law, began to work for
the Kushner partnerships in 1985.79 Stadtmauer worked his way up to his
eventual role as Executive Vice President, where his responsibilities in-
cluded the oversight and management of partnership properties.8 0
Stadtmauer also owned a small percentage of numerous Kushner partner-
ships and co-owned an entity that collected management fees from the
partnerships.8 1 Every spring, Stadtmauer met annually with the partner-
ships' Chief Financial Officer and accountant to review and sign tax re-
turns.82 He did not spend much time reviewing the returns, however, nor
did he inquire as to the nature of the partnerships' expenses deducted on
the returns.8
The Government charged Stadtmauer and others with conspiring to
file false or fraudulent tax returns for the 1998-2001 tax years for several
of the partnerships.8 4 On the tax returns for the years at issue, the Gov-
ernment alleged that the partnerships fraudulently claimed several catego-
ries of expenditures as fully deductible business expenses.85
77. See id. (summarizing convictions Kushner faced from Government).
78. See id. (detailing involvement of other Kushner employees). Several indi-
viduals testified against Stadtmauer, including the former Chief Financial Officer,
the Chief Operations Officer, and a subsequent Chief Financial Officer. See id.
(noting that only one of these three individuals was indicted).
79. See id. (providing background information about Stadtmauer).
Stadtmauer was also a Certified Public Accountant and a law school graduate. See
id. (describing Stadtmauer's professional background).
80. See id. (explaining Stadtmauer's responsibilities within partnerships).
81. See id. (describing Stadtmauer's extensive role in operation and manage-
ment of Kushner's partnerships).
82. See id. at 246-47 (noting Stadtmauer's refusal to sign tax returns without
accountant's financial statements for partnerships in hand).
83. See id. at 259 (cataloging evidence which contributed to Stadtmauer's inti-
mate familiarity with partnerships). The court noted that a possible inference
stemming from the fact that Stadtmauer did not ask his accountants about the
partnerships' deductions is that Stadtmauer deliberately avoided acknowledging
the fraudulent nature of the deductions. See id. (analyzing Stadtmauer's lack of
inquiry into partnership deductions).
84. See id. at 243 (listing partnerships for which Stadtmauer and others alleg-
edly filed false or fraudulent tax returns).
85. See id. (detailing alleged conspiracy in which Stadtmauer and others
agreed to file false or fraudulent tax returns for management company and eleven
other partnerships). The categories of expenditures fraudulently claimed as fully
deductible business expenses were: (1) charitable contributions; (2) expenditures
incurred by one partnership but paid by a different one, or "non-property" ex-
penses; (3) capital expenditures; and (4) gift and entertainment expenses. See id.
(noting that these expenses were deducted in full as ordinary business expenses).
"The Internal Revenue Code provides that an expenditure is fully deductible as a
business expense if it: '(1) was paid or incurred during the taxable year; (2) was for
carrying on a trade or business; (3) was an expense; (4) was a necessary expense;
and (5) was an ordinary expense.'" Id. at 243 n.7 (quoting Neonatology Assocs.,
792
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Stadtmauer was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and
nine counts of willfully aiding in the filing of materially false or fraudulent
tax returns." On appeal, the Third Circuit's consideration of the case
dealt principally with whether the district court erred in giving a willful
blindness instruction for Stadtmauer's conviction 87 The court's review re-
quired an evaluation of the Supreme Court's standard for willfulness as
established in Cheek, and a determination of whether the instruction was
consistent with this standard.88
To convict Stadtmauer of willfully aiding in the preparation of materi-
ally false or fraudulent tax returns, the Government had to prove a volun-
tary and intentional violation of a known legal duty.89 The Government
relied on several pieces of circumstantial evidence to establish
Stadtmauer's knowledge of his legal duties, including: (1) Stadtmauer's
intimate familiarity with the partnerships and the methods by which the
partnerships maintained their general ledgers; (2) evidence that
Stadtmauer had made decisions on the tax treatment of partnership ex-
penses in the past; and (3) other evidence that suggested Stadtmauer's
consciousness of guilt.90 Following a jury trial, Stadtmauer was convicted
of conspiracy and nine counts of aiding in willfully filing materially false or
P.A. v. Comm'r, 299 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2002)). Although partnerships them-
selves do not pay taxes, they are nonetheless required to file income tax returns.
See Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 243 n.8 ( "'[F]or the purpose of computing income and
deductions, the partnership is regarded as an independently recognizable entity
apart from the aggregate of its partners. It is only once the partnership's income
and deductions are ascertained and reported that its existence may be disregarded
and the partnership becomes a conduit through which the taxpaying obligation
passes to the individual partners."' (quoting Brannen v. Comm'r, 722 F.2d 695,
703 (11th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). For a more complete
discussion of the process used by Stadtmauer and other involved employees to
fraudulently deduct these expenses on the partnerships' tax returns, see
Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 244-47.
86. See Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 241 (providing details of defendant's convic-
tion). Stadtmauer was convicted for conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and
for filing materially false or fraudulent returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2).
See id. (detailing charges brought against defendant). Section 7206(2) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code makes it a crime to "[w]illfully aid[ ] or assist[ ] in ... the
preparation or presentation under, or in connection with any matter arising
under, the internal revenue laws, of a return . . . which is fraudulent or is false as to
any material matter, whether or not such falsity or fraud is with the knowledge or
consent of the person authorized or required to present such return." 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(2) (2006).
87. See Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 241 (noting that defendant raised many chal-
lenges to district court on appeal).
88. See id. at 241-42 (concluding that decision was in line with sister circuit
courts).
89. See id. at 247 (citing United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976))
(outlining evidence that Government used to establish Stadtmauer's knowledge).
90. See id. (cataloging circumstantial evidence Government used to establish
willfulness). The court further emphasized that Stadtmauer did not spend suffi-
cient time reviewing the partnerships' tax returns and did not inquire about the
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fraudulent tax returns.9 1 After receiving a sentence of thirty-eight months
in prison, Stadtmauer timely appealed his conviction.9 2 Stadtmauer's pri-
mary contention on appeal focused on the court's decision to issue a will-
ful blindness instruction.9 3
B. The District Court's Willful Blindness Instruction
The district court instructed the jury that when a "defendant close [s]
his eyes to what would otherwise be obvious to the defendant," the knowl-
edge element of willfulness is satisfied.9 4 The court specified that the jury
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Stadtmauer (1) "was aware of a
high probability that the tax returns at issue were false or fraudulent as to
a material matter" and (2) "consciously and deliberately tried to avoid
learning about this fact."95 The instructions also included a provision that
the jury could not find the element of knowledge if it found only that
Stadtmauer should have known that the tax returns were false or fraudu-
lent, or that a reasonable person would have known of a high probability that
they were false. 96 Finally, the district court emphasized that it was insuffi-
cient that Stadtmauer was "stupid or foolish or may have acted out of inad-
vertence or accident. A showing of negligence or of a good-faith mistake
of law is not .. . sufficient to support a finding of ... knowledge."9 7
C. Returns Gone Wrong: Upholding Stadtmauer's Convictions
On appeal, Stadtmauer's principal argument rested on the district
court's willful blindness instruction to the jury, which he claimed was in-
consistent with Cheek's interpretation of willfulness. 98 Stadtmauer asserted
deductions made. See id. at 259 (discussing evidence that supported willful blind-
ness instruction).
91. See id. at 251 (summarizingjury verdict). For a discussion of Stadtmauer's
conspiracy and willful filing of materially false or fraudulent tax return charges, see
supra notes 76-90 and accompanying text.
92. See Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 251 (noting that prior to trial, district court also
denied defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal and to dismiss indictment).
93. See id. at 252 (addressing Stadtmauer's claim that district court incorrectly
issued willful blindness instruction).
94. Id. at 253.
95. See id. at 257 (providing district court's instructions to jury on willful
blindness).
96. See id. (concluding that district court's instructions adhered to Third Cir-
cuit precedent).
97. Id.
98. See id. at 254 (disagreeing with defendant's argument that willful blind-
ness instruction violates holding in Cheek). The defense argued that "[i]t is diffi-
cult to imagine how a jury could ever find that a defendant voluntarily and
intentionally violated a legal duty he was unaware of" Reply Brief for Appellant at
35, Stadimauer, 620 F.3d 238 (No. 09-1575). The main argument was that a deliber-
ate ignorance instruction eliminates the Government's burden of proving that the
defendant was aware of the duty at issue. See id. at 38-39 (detailing defense's
arguments).
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that willful blindness instructions are "categorically and unequivocally" in-
appropriate to establish willful conduct as required by criminal tax
offenses.99
The Third Circuit rejected Stadtmauer's claim that willful blindness
instructions violate Cheek.10 0 On the contrary, the court reasoned that
Cheek draws a clear distinction between two categories of taxpayers: (1)
those with actual knowledge of the legal obligation and (2) those who, in
good faith, are ignorant of the obligation, misunderstand it, or believe
that it does not exist.10 1 Criminal tax liability cannot attach to taxpayers in
the second category because, in such cases, the Government has not
proven that the defendant was even aware of the relevant legal duty.102
The court rejected Stadtmauer's attempt to insulate himself from
criminal liability because he deliberately avoided learning of his responsi-
bilities under the law.10 3 Instead, the court concluded that Cheek did not
exempt defendants in criminal tax cases from willful blindness instruc-
tions. 1 0 4 The Third Circuit relied on language from Cheek to conclude
that a taxpayer who deliberately avoids learning of his or her legal obliga-
tions does not fall in the category of taxpayers who "'earnestly wish to
follow the law.'"105 The Third Circuit, therefore, upheld Stadtmauer's
conviction based on his deliberate avoidance of further investigating the
facts, which would have made him aware of his legal obligations. 106
99. See Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 254 (stating that criminal tax offenses require
Government to prove that defendant had legal duty and that defendant knew of
that duty).
100. See id. (distinguishing willful blindness of knowledge of facts from knowl-
edge of applicable law).
101. See id. at 255 (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Cheek).
102. See id. (describing distinction between two categories of taxpayers); see
also Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991) (stating that ultimate issue is
whether Government can prove defendant's awareness of legal duty at issue).
103. See Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 255 (emphasizing that "'deliberate ignorance
and positive knowledge are equally culpable"' (quoting United States v.Jewell, 532
F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976))).
104. See id. at 256 (noting that Cheek contained no willful blindness
instruction).
105. See id. (quoting Cheek, 498 U.S. at 205) (explaining that justification for
requiring knowledge of relevant legal duty is to protect innocent taxpayers).
106. See id. at 257 (concluding district court's willful blindness instruction cor-
rectly stated law). In discussing the evidence that supported a willful blindness
instruction, the court emphasized the fact that Stadtmauer spent little time review-
ing the partnerships' tax returns and deliberately avoided asking his accountants
whether deductions on the tax returns were properly calculated. See id. at 259
(analyzing "abundant evidence" of Stadtmauer's intimate familiarity with partner-
ships and their finances).
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IV. STADTMAUER'S LEGITIMACY AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR
PROSECUTION OF TAX CRIMES
The Third Circuit's decision in Stadtmauer carries strong implications
for the criminal tax field.1 07 First, the decision concretely establishes the
availability of willful blindness instructions within the Third Circuit while
further legitimizing circuit courts that have held that such instructions do
not run afoul of Cheek.108 Second, Stadtmauer aids in clarifying the proper
interpretation of willfulness in tax statutes, particularly the distinction be-
tween knowledge and good faith claims of ignorance of tax obligations.10 9
Finally, the Third Circuit opinion provides insight for practitioners han-
dling cases similar to Stadtmauer, specifically in terms of how to frame argu-
ments regarding defendants who claim ignorance.1 10
A. Stadtmauer's Foundation in Circuit Courts and Third Circuit Precedent
Stadtmauer derives legitimacy both from its sister circuits and from
Third Circuit precedent. 1 ' Stadtmauer specifically adhered to language
from First and Eleventh Circuit decisions holding that a defendant's de-
fense of ignorance will fail if the defendant remained ignorant by deliber-
ately turning a blind eye so as to avoid materials that would have informed
the defendant of the applicable legal duties." 2 Accordingly, Stadtmauer
falls in line with the other circuit courts that have specifically addressed
willful blindness within the context of Cheek." 8
107. For a discussion of Stadtmauers implications for the criminal tax field,
see infra notes 108-42 and accompanying text.
108. For a discussion of Stadtmauers legitimacy both in other circuit court
decisions and in Third Circuit precedent, see infra notes 114-19 and accompanying
text.
109. For a discussion of the willfulness standard in criminal tax cases, includ-
ing insight regarding the definition of knowledge derived from Stadtmauer, see in-fra notes 120-34 and accompanying text.
110. For a discussion of how practitioners handling criminal tax cases should
proceed with Stadtmauer's holding in mind, see infra notes 133-40 and accompany-
ing text.
111. See Jeremy D. Frey & Paul D. Pellegrini, Willful Blindness Instructions in
Criminal Tax Cases: The Third Circuit's Stadtmauer Ruling, CLIENT ALERT (Pepper
Hamilton LLP, Philadelphia, PA) Nov. 16, 2010, at 1-2, available at http://www.
pepperlaw.com/publications.update.aspx?ArticleKey=1940 (asserting that
Stadtmauer decision falls in line with First, Eight, and Eleventh Circuit treatment of
willful blindness). See generally United States v. Anthony, 545 F.3d 60, 64-65 (1st
Cir. 2008) (holding willful blindness instructions appropriate in criminal tax pro-
ceedings and do not violate willfulness standard set in Cheek); United States v.
Dean, 487 F.3d 840, 851 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that deliberate ignorance in-
struction is appropriate when defendant is subjectively aware of high probability of
fact in question); United States v. Dykstra, 991 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1993) (same);
United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985) (same).
112. See United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 257 (3d Cir. 2010) (em-
phasizing that one's personal belief that one is complying with tax laws must be
held in good faith (citing Anthony, 545 F.3d at 65)).
113. See generally Anthony, 545 F.3d at 64-65 (holding that willful blindness in-
structions do not run afoul of Cheek); Dean, 487 F.3d at 851 (same); Dykstra, 991
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The Third Circuit also noted that its decision to allow willful blind-
ness instructions in criminal tax cases adheres to circuit precedent.1 14
The instructions issued by the district court mirrored the requirement pre-
viously established in United States v. Wert-Ruiz' 1 5 and United States v. Cami-
nos'1 6 for a willful blindness instruction to stipulate that the defendant
must be subjectively, not merely objectively, aware of the high probability
of the fact at issue .1 7 Additionally, the district court emphasized that ei-
ther negligence or a good faith mistake are insufficient to establish knowl-
edge.' 18  Stadtmauer effectively made available willful blindness
instructions to federal prosecutors in similar criminal tax proceedings so
long as they are in accordance with the requirements detailed above.119
B. Out of the Oven: Stadtmauer's Impacts Within the Third Circuit
The Third Circuit in Stadtmauer establishes that willful blindness in-
structions used to determine willfulness in tax crimes do not run afoul of
Cheek.120 As such, Stadtmauer conclusively broadens the definition of the
knowledge aspect of willful conduct, thereby expanding the scope of cul-
pable conduct that fits within this definition.12 1 By limiting the ability of
an individual facing criminal tax liability to claim ignorance, the Third
Circuit has implicitly both imposed a duty on taxpayers to acknowledge
F.2d at 450 (same). For a discussion on the First, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits'
treatment of willful blindness within the context of Cheek, see supra notes 57-60 and
accompanying text.
114. See Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 257 (stating specifically that instructions used
by district court adhered to Third Circuit precedent).
115. 228 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000).
116. 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985).
117. See Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 257 (describing how willful blindness instruc-
tions in Stadtmauer adhered to requirements set by Wert-Ruiz and Caminos).
118. See id. (noting knowledge could not be found if Stadtmauer simply acted
foolishly or out of inadvertence). Subsequent to Stadtmauer, the Third Circuit has
reiterated that the good faith defense should be "limited to true misunderstand-
ings rather than extended to broad excuses for refusal to pay taxes." United States
v. Mostler, 411 F. App'x 521, 524 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming defendant's conviction
for tax evasion).
119. See Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 273 (upholding district court's conviction of
Stadtmauer, as "a willful blindness instruction may, where warranted by the trial
evidence in a criminal tax case, properly apply to a defendant's knowledge of his
legal duties").
120. See id. at 256 (stating that nothing in Cheek prevents use of willful blind-
ness instruction in criminal tax cases).
121. Cf United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting
justification for willful blindness instruction is that "deliberate ignorance and posi-
tive knowledge are equally culpable"). Because deliberate ignorance yields the
same liabilities as positive knowledge, a willful blindness instruction will add to the
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their obligations under the tax code and lessened the government's bur-
den in obtaining tax crime convictions.122
First, by broadening the type of actions that will fall under the cate-
gory of willful conduct, Stadtmauer implicitly requires taxpayers to acknowl-
edge their legal duties under the tax code and realize the consequences of
noncompliance.' 2 3 This obligation stems from the fact that the availabil-
ity of willful blindness instructions to federal prosecutors allows the jury to
consider objective elements of a taxpayer's situation, potentially including
whether the taxpayer performed adequate due diligence. 124 This evalua-
tion of a defendant according to an objective standard is due, in part, to
the fact that "[t]he more unreasonable the asserted beliefs or misunder-
standings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to be nothing
more than simple disagreement with known legal duties imposed by the
tax laws."1 25 Because an unreasonable belief is likely to be met with doubt
by a jury, taxpayers in noncompliance must be able to clearly establish a
good faith belief that they were not in violation of any tax code
provisions.' 2 6
The Third Circuit reiterated established dicta that "' [t] he substantive
justification for [a willful blindness instruction] is that deliberate igno-
rance and positive knowledge are equally culpable.'"127 To establish a
good faith claim of ignorance or misunderstanding, however, a taxpayer
seemingly need only have performed adequate due diligence or, in
Stadtmauer's case, inquiry into the deductions on tax returns.128 Further-
122. See Frey & Pellegrini, supra note 111 (suggesting that Stadtmauer will
make it easier for prosecutors to convict).
123. For a discussion of how Stadtmauer requires taxpayers to investigate their
legal duties under the tax code, see infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
124. See Brenda S. Hustis & John Y. Gotanda, The Responsible Corporate Officer:
Designated Felon or Legal Fiction?, 25 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 169, 178-79 (1994) (explaining
how knowledge is inferred when certain facts would have caused most people to
further investigate but defendant did not); Frey & Pellegrini, supra note 111 (dis-
cussing case on appeal to Second Circuit involving willful blindness instruction
where defendant was convicted for inadequate due diligence).
125. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203-04 (1992) (rejecting notion
that good faith belief must be objectively reasonable). The Court in Cheek also
suggests that the more unreasonable the defendant's belief, the more likely the
jury will find that the Government has carried its burden of proving knowledge.
See id. at 204 (commenting on effects of unreasonable belief on jury's evaluation of
defendant's mental state).
126. See United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 256 (3d Cir. 2010) (em-
phasizing that good faith misunderstanding or ignorance requires that such belief
be honestly and genuinely held).
127. Id. at 255 (quoting United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.
1976)). Acting with knowledge, "'therefore, is not necessarily to act only with posi-
tive knowledge, but also to act with an awareness of the high probability of the
existence of the fact in question.'" Id. (quoting Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700).
128. See id. at 259 (discussing evidence which led to willful blindness instruc-
tion). The court relied on evidence that Stadtmauer spent little time reviewing the
partnerships' tax returns before signing them, and that he did not ask the partner-
ship accountant about the nature of deductions made, to conclude that the willful
798 [Vol. 56: p. 779
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more, in light of opinion that the tax code is no longer the arcane and
complex structure that it once was, investigating one's legal responsibili-
ties under the tax code may likewise not be as daunting a task as it may
have been in the past.'2 9 The availability of a willful blindness instruction
in criminal tax proceedings, therefore, does not significantly increase the
burden on taxpayers to understand the law, but merely requires that tax-
payers perform simple inquiry into their legal duties and adjust their con-
duct to comply with such obligations.13 0
Second, the established availability of willful blindness instructions
within the Third Circuit for criminal tax proceedings eases the govern-
ment's burden in obtaining convictions.1 3 ' In a field of law where direct
evidence is extremely difficult to acquire, the willful blindness theory
opens one more door through which the government may establish a de-
fendant's knowledge of applicable legal duties under the tax code.132 The
government's access to this instruction on knowledge in cases such as
Stadtmauer, where the defendant clearly buried his head in the sand to
avoid learning about his legal obligations, allows the government to con-
centrate its evidence-gathering efforts on circumstantial evidence that
points to the taxpayer's level of sophistication and past compliance ef-
forts. 1 3 3 Because the IRS already targets prominent, more sophisticated
blindness instruction was properly given. See id. (noting that Government need
not present direct evidence to establish willful blindness). Where a taxpayer's ef-
forts to learn about the applicable legal obligations, however, are proven to be
selective, a willful blindness instruction may still be appropriate. See Bucy, supra
note 17, at 664 (describing situations in which willful blindness instruction may be
appropriate).
129. See Yochum, supra note 19, at 252 (expressing belief that "no longer is
the tax statute an arcane regulatory device but rather . . . well-understood in its
fundamental obligations"). Professor Yochum posits that if cases involve complex
rules, the availability of vagueness challenges should be sufficient to protect inno-
cent taxpayers. See id. (proposing statutory modification to reduce confusion asso-
ciated with tax crimes).
130. Cf Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d at 259 (detailing circumstances of Stadtmauer's
position and actions that helped Government to establish willfulness in this case);
Hustis & Gotanda, supra note 124, at 178-79 (explaining inferences of knowledge
in stating: "[k] nowledge of facts that would induce most people to investigate fur-
ther, but which did not so induce the defendant, allows an inference that the de-
fendant knew the facts that would be uncovered upon investigation and thus
consciously avoided discovering those facts").
131. See Bucy, supra note 17, at 664 (describing how willful blindness instruc-
tions are helpful to government); Frey & Pellegrini, supra note 111 (stating that
willful blindness instructions make it easier for federal prosecutors to convict in
criminal tax cases).
132. See Sean Basinski & Andrew Forman, Tax Violations, 37 AM. CluM. L. REV.
1003, 1012 (2000) (noting difficulty for government to establish direct proof in tax
crimes).
133. See id. at 1019 (explaining that in cases where defendants claims knowl-
edge, "fact-finders look to the taxpayer's conduct and past record of compliance,
as well as the taxpayer's sophistication and level of knowledge" (footnotes omit-
ted)). The government employs three primary methods of obtaining circumstan-
tial evidence in criminal tax cases: net worth, cash expenditures, and bank
2012] CASEBRIEF 799
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taxpayers in criminal tax prosecutions, a willful blindness instruction may
often mean the difference between acquittal and conviction.' 3 4
C. Advice to Practitioners
The decision in Stadtmauer offers noteworthy guidance for practition-
ers, particularly defense attorneys, handling criminal tax cases within the
Third Circuit.' 3 5 First, defense attorneys should seek to limit the govern-
ment's opportunity to use a willful blindness instruction.136 A willful
blindness instruction is only appropriate when there is sufficient evidence
that the defendant actually knew of the fact in question, but refrained
from obtaining the final confirmation.' 3 7 Therefore, such instructions
should only be given when warranted by sufficient evidence and should be
used "sparingly."13 3 Practitioners defending individuals faced with crimi-
nal tax allegations should therefore always object to any willful blindness
instruction in addition to carefully reviewing the language of the govern-
ment's proposed instruction. 39
Defense attorneys should be wary of the potential for willful blindness
instructions to confuse the jury, as willful blindness may look extremely
similar to recklessness or even negligence regarding knowledge of mate-
rial facts or legal duties.14 0 As such, practitioners should ensure that will-
ful blindness instructions make clear that the jury must find that the
deposits. See id. at 1013 (describing how government establishes circumstantial
evidence in such cases).
134. See Knight & Knight, supra note 75, at 178 (stating that IRS "may be more
likely to press a case involving a locally prominent taxpayer than a relatively ob-
scure person"); Frey & Pellegrini, supra note 111 (noting that in Stadtmauer willful
blindness instruction "could have made all the difference" for conviction).
135. For a discussion providing insights to criminal tax practitioners in the
Third Circuit, see infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
136. See Frey & Pelligrini, supra note 111 (advocating for defense counsel to
seek to exclude evidence "that might support government arguments to the court
that a willful blindness instruction to the jury is warranted by the trial evidence").
137. See United States v. Reyes, 302 F.3d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 2002) ("'A court can
properly find wilful [sic] blindness only where it can almost be said that the defen-
dant actually knew."' (quoting GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL
PART § 57, at 159 (2d ed. 1961))); see also Bucy, supra note 17, at 664 (noting that
defendants deliberately ignore certain facts to be able to deny knowledge if
indicted).
138. See Bucy, supra note 17, at 663 (stipulating that instructions must be war-
ranted by sufficient evidence).
139. See id. ("It is inappropriate to give this instruction where the facts sup-
port actual knowledge or where the evidence justifies only two possible conclu-
sions: knowledge or no knowledge."). On appeal, the Third Circuit will review a
district court's issuance of willful blindness instructions for abuse of discretion and
view facts "in the light most favorable to the government." See United States v.
Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000) (providing standard of review).
140. See generally United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 254 (3d Cir. 2010)
(specifying that willfulness cannot be established by mistake, ignorance, or negli-
gence); see also Frey & Pellegrini, supra note 111 (remarking on confusion caused
by willful blindness instructions).
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defendant deliberately ignored the fact at issue, and was not merely negli-
gent in failing to learn of the fact.1 4 ' Finally, defense counsel should seek
counter-instructions when appropriate.142
V. CONCLUSION
Because the Third Circuit in Stadtmauer firmly endorsed the use of
willful blindness instructions in criminal tax proceedings, there exists a
broader definition of knowledge and, along with it, a wider scope of tax-
payer conduct that is susceptible to criminal liability.' 4 3 As a result of this
decision, it will be easier for the government to establish a defendant's
willful conduct and, therefore, easier to obtain convictions in cases similar
to Stadtmauer's.144 Taxpayers, on the other hand, will face greater diffi-
culty in claiming good faith ignorance or misunderstanding of the tax
code unless their beliefs are reasonable.145 The Third Circuit's decision
in Stadtmauer has effectively "sniped down" any opportunities for taxpayers
to simply bury their heads in the sand.i4 6
141. See Frey & Pelligrini, supra note 1111 ("[T]he concept of conscious avoid-
ance is that the defendant 'be shown to have decided not to learn the key fact, not
merely to have failed to learn it through negligence."' (quoting United States v.
Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1993))).
142. See id. (providing advice for defense attorneys involved in criminal tax
proceedings).
143. For further discussion of the broadened definition of knowledge estab-
lished in Stadtmauerand its impact on culpable conduct, see supra notes 111-19 and
accompanying text.
144. For a discussion of the government's eased burden of establishing will-
fulness within the criminal tax context, see surpa notes 131-34 and accompanying
text.
145. For a discussion of the increased difficulty for taxpayers to establish
claims of ignorance in the criminal tax context, see supra notes 123-30 and accom-
panying text.
146. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's decision upholding the district
court's willful blindness instructions, see supra notes 75-106 and accompanying
text.
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